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I

n response to a Committee for Human Rights inquiry related to the targeted
killing of an alleged al Qaida operative in Yemen, the United States asserted:
The Government of the United States respectfully submits that inquiries related to
allegations stemming from any military operations conducted during the course o f an
armed conflict with AI Qaidado not fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.

AI Qaida and related terrorist networks are at war with the United States .
Despite coalition success in Afghanistan and around the world, the war is far from
over. The AI Qaida network today is a multinational enterprise with operations in
more than 60 countries.l
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Making the Case for Conflict Bifurcation in Afghanistan
This assertion of the existence of an armed conflict between al Qaida and the
United States was both dear and emphatic, specifically rejecting the proposition
that the killing was governed by human rights norms. It also represents what many
believe is a radical theory of law: that an armed conflict can exist between a State
and a transnational non-State entity.2
In no location has this latter proposition been more contested than in Afghanistan. Although al Qaida may very well operate in over sixty countries around the
world , the reality is that almost all the US military effort directed against that enemy has occurred in Afghanistan, where much of that effort has been intertwined
with the effort to defeat the Taliban armed forces. Because ofthe contiguo us nature ofthese operations, most scholars and lawof armed co nflict (LOAC) experts
have asserted from the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom that operations
directed against al Qaida in Afghanistan are subsumed within the broader armed
conflict in Afghanistan. Accordingly, they reject categorically the suggestion that
there was, or is, in Afghanistan a distinct armed conflict between the United
States and al Qaida.3 Instead, operations directed against al Qaida were initially
just a component of the broaderinternational armed conflict between the US-led
coalition and the Taliban regime, and thereafter of the non-international armed
conflict between the Kharzai government and its coalition backers and the remnants of the Taliban.
But if the premise asserted in the US response excerpted above is valid-that an
armed conflict does exist between the United States and al Qaida-the question of
the nat ure of that conflict in Afghanistan is arguably more complex. By staking out
a new category of armed conflict, what I have labeled in previous articles as transnational armed conflict, the United States created the potential to treat the contiguous conflicts in Afghanistan as distinct.
Such a theory of conflict bifurcation has potentially profound consequences. If
there was and is only one armed conflict in Afghanistan, then rights and obligations related to al Qaida operatives must be analyzed under the regulatory regime
related to that broader conflict. This would impact a wide array of legal issues,
ranging from status of detainees, transferability and command responsibility to jurisdiction related to criminal sanction for violation of the LOAC. If, in contrast, the
conflict between the United States and al Qaida occurring in Afghanistan is treated
as distinct from the conflicts related to the Taliban, a far more uncertain legal
framework would dictate a distinct package of rights and obligations vis-a.-vis al
Qaida. This framework would be, at best, composed of general LOAC principles,
perhaps supplemented by policy extension of conventional LOAC provisions. 4
This article will analyze the two primary impediments to recognizing such a bifurcated conflict theory. The first of these is related to recognition in the context of an
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international armed conflict-that in such a context al Qaida is properly and exclusively treated as a militia or volunteer group associated with the Taliban armed
forces. The second is related to recognition in the context of a non-international
armed conflict-that unless al Qaida is an element of the insurgent forces fighting
against the Kharzai government, operations conducted against al Qaida cannot be
characterized as armed conflict but must instead be characterized as extraterritorial law enforcement.
A theory of bifurcated armed conflict is concededly unconventional. Even if
such a theory is viable in the abstract, it is particularly problematic in relation to the
conflict in Afghanistan. This is because of the unavoidable reality that unlike the
type of " one off" operations exemplified by the Predator strike that generated the
Department of State assertion above, operations in Afghanistan directed against al
Qaida are geographically and often operationally contiguous with those directed
against the Taliban. Further complicating the theory is that operations conducted
by al Qaida were, and are often are, intertwined with those conducted by the
Taliban. However, these complicating realities only highlight the ultimate question: does all this mean that the legal character of the armed conflicts themselves
must be contiguous? It is precisely because the United States has asserted the existence of a distinct armed conflict with al Qaida that this question must be critically
considered.
Transnational Arm ed Conflict: Has Reality Outpaced Legality?

Defining the nature of the armed conflict against al Qaida-if there can be such an
armed conflict-is obviously critical to this analysis. As I have asserted in previous
articles,S the traditionally understood law-triggering paradigm that evolved from
the development of Common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions proved
insufficient to respond to the need for battlefield regulation of counterterror combat operations. 6 These operations, particularly those conducted in response to the
attacks of September 11 , 2001 reflect the reality that the basic regulatory framework of the law of armed conflict must be triggered by any armed conflict. Because
this is the critical predicate for the application of a bifurcated conflict theory to Afghanistan , this section (reproduced with light edits from my prior article,
"Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict"7) will explain the underlying rationale
for a transnational, or any, armed conflict theory.
The "either/or" law-triggering paradigm of Common Articles 2 and 38 proved
generally sufficient to address the types of armed conflicts occurring up until 9/1 1.
However, this fact no longer justifies the conclusion that no other triggering
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standard should be recognized. Instead, as the events since 9/11 have illustrated so
convincingly, such recognition is essential in order to keep pace with the evolving
nature of armed conflicts themselves. The prospect of an unregulated battlefield is
simply unacceptable in the international community, a fact demonstrated by the
response to the conflict in Lebanon. 9 The ultimate question, therefore, is whether it
is best to continue to try and fit the proverbial square "armed conflict" peg into the
round "Common Article 3" hole, or whether the time has come to acknowledge
that the essential trigger for application of basic LOAC principles is just armed confli ct, irrespective of the enemy or the location.
The stress on the existing paradigm oflaw of war application reflected in the diverging conclusions of both the DC Circuit and the Supreme Court in the Hamdan
case is in no way fatal to the ability of the law to adapt to the necessities of the
changing nature of warfare. All law is adaptive, but this is particularly true with regard to the LOAC, a conclusion illustrated by the fact that this law has endured for
centuries. This area of international legal regulation has been historically resilient
precisely because the law has always responded to the changes in the nature of warfare . Perhaps more importantly, these responses have been implemented in a manner considered credible by States and the armed forces called upon to execute
military conflicts.
It is essential that the applicability of the principles of the laws of war-principles
that operate to limit the brutality of war and mitigate the suffering of victims of
war-not be restricted by an overly technica1 legal triggering paradigm. Accordingly, the ongoing evolution in the nature of warfare requires acknowledgment
that any armed confli ct triggers the foundational principles of the laws of war. If
this outcome is achieved by characterizing such military operations as "'Common
Article 3" conflicts that trigger the hwnane treatment obligation plus additional
customary LOAC principles, the regulatory purpose of the law can be achieved.
However, because Common Article 3 conflicts have become generally synonymous with internal conflicts, it is more pragmatic to expressly endorse a hybrid category of armed conflict: transnational armed conflict. to
The recognition of this "hybrid" category would not render Common Articles 2
or 3 irrelevant. Instead, these articles would continue to selVe as triggers for application of the treaty provisions to which they relate. But this new category would be
responsive to the rapidly changing nature of warfare, a change that creates an increased likelihood that States will resort to the use of combat power to respond to
threats posed by non-State armed entities operating outside their territory. Such
armed conflicts justify a more precise interpretation of the de facto conditions that
trigger the foundational principles of the laws of war, supporting the conclusion
that any de facto armed conflict selVes as such a trigger. Common Articles 2 and 3
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would then selVe to trigger layers of more defined regulation in some ways redundant to, and in other ways augmenting, these principles. This "layered" methodology will ensure no conflict falls outside the scope of essential baseline regulation,
while preselVing the technical triggers for more detailed regulation required by application of specific treaty provisions.
This bifurcated methodology of distinguishing between treaty provisions per se
and the principles providing the foundation for these treaty provisions was an essential aspect of the first major international war crimes trial since the advent of
Common Articles 2 and 3. In the seminal decision defining the jurisdiction of the
first international war crimes tribunal since World War II , Prosecutor v. Tadic,ll the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY), an ad hoc war
crimes court created by the United Nations Security Council to prosecute alleged
war criminals from the conflict that followed the breakup of the former Yugoslavia,
relied on a similar methodology. The Tribunal was able to sustain many war crimes
allegations only by extending to the realm of non-international armed conflict fundamental principles of the laws of war derived from treaty articles applicable only
to international anned con llicts. 12 According to this seminal decision, the requirements for application of individual criminal responsibility under Article 3 of its
Statute (vesting the Tribunal with competence to adjudicate violations of the laws
or customs of war) were that "(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a
r ule of international humanitarian law" and "( ii) the rule m ust be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions must be met .... "13 Accordingly, the Tribunal relied on this methodology to fill a regulatory gap essential
to establish individual criminal responsibility in relation to the anned conflict, the
exact same logic that supports a further reliance on this methodology to regulate
transnational armed conflicts.
The pragmatic logic of adopting an ipso facto application of these fundamental
principles to any armed conflict suggested in the Tadic ruling has also been at the
core of US military policy for decades. It also provided the ratio decidendi for the
Hamdan majority holding that the principle of humane treatment applied to the
armed conflict between the United States and al Qaida. The Hamdan majority endorsed a modified version of the Common Article 2/3 "either/or" paradigm. The
scope of international armed conflict defined by Common Article 2 was left intact.
However, instead of endorsing the intra-State qualifier to the alternate "type" of
armed conflict, the Court concluded that the term "non-international" as used in
Common Article 3 operates in juxtaposition to international armed conflicts, and
therefore covers all armed conflicts falling outside the scope of Common Article 2.
Accordingly, the Court detennined that a non-international anned conflict
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includes the traditional category of internal armed conflicts, but also extraterritorial armed conflicts between a State and non-State forces. As Justice Stevens noted:
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that common article 3
does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being "'international in
scope,'" does not qualify as a "'conflict not of an international character.'" That
reasoning is erroneous. The te rm "conflict not of an international character" is used
here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations. So much is demonstrated by
the "fundamental logic [of] the Convention's provisions on its application." Common
article 2 provides that "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties." High Contracting Parties (signatories) also must abide by all
terms of the Conventions vis-a-vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a
nonsignatory "Power," and must so abide vis-a-vis the nonsignatory if "the latter
accepts and applies" those terms. Common article 3, by contrast, affords some
minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to
individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power" who
are involved in a conflict "in the territory of" a signatory. The latter kind of conflict is
distinguishable from the conflict described in common article 2 chiefly because it does
not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not). In context, then, the
phrase "not of an international character" bears irs literal meaning. 14

This interpretation of the scope of Common Article 3 was the essential predicate to
the Court's holding that the procedures established by the President for the military commission violated the laws of war. It is also thoroughly consistent with the
view that all situations of armed conflict require regulation, the view that has motivated US military policy for decades.
Recognition that combat is an endeavor that must trigger an effective regulatory
framework is derived from a long-standing history of self-imposed regulatory
codes adopted by professional armed forces. As is suggested by A.P.V. Rogers in his
book Law on the Battlefield,15 prior to the development of the legal "triggering
mechanisms" controlling application of this regulatory framework, anned forces
did not appear to consider "conflict typing" as an essential predicate for operating
within the lim its of such a framework. While it is true that throughout most of history this framework took the form of self-imposed limits on warrior conduct,16
these limits provided the seeds for what are today regarded as the foundational
principles of the laws ofwar. 11 Thus, the pragmatic military logic reflected in both
the Hamdan decision and the Department of Defense law of war policy is deeply
rooted in the history of warfare.
This history undoubtedly includes examples of combat operations conducted
by the regular armed forces of States against non-State armed groups prior to the
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development of Common Article 3. These operations ranged from colonial expeditions to what would today be characterized as "coalition " operations, such as the
multinational response to the Boxers in China. In his book Savage Wars of Peace, 18
Max Boot provides several examples of such combat operations conducted by the
armed forces of the United States prior to the Second World War, ranging from the
conflict against the Barbary Pirates to the punitive expedition against Pancho Villa.
Armed forces executing such operations must have invoked what today would be
characterized as the principle of military necessity, asserting the authority to take
all measures not forbidden by international law necessary to achieve the prompt
submission of their opponents. However, these forces must have also respected
what would today be regarded as the principle of humanity, as understood in historical context. 19 While the nature of the constraint on the conduct of these operations may have been understood more in terms of "chivalry" and less in terms of
law,21) the basic premise that runs through this history to the contemporary battlefield is that combat operations trigger a framewo rk of regulation necessary for disciplined operations. Today, this framewo rk is best understood not in terms of a
chivalric code, but in terms of compliance with the principles of necessity, humanity, distinction and the prohibition against inflicting unnecessary suffering. 21
It is, of course, improper to assert that the pre-1949 history of military operations supports a conclusion that armed forces regarded such operations as triggering legal obligations. On the contrary, the international legal character of the laws
of war in relation to contemporary warfare was based primarily on treaties that applied to conflicts between States. This point is emphasized by Professor Green in
his book Tile Contemporary Law of Armed Conflia:
Historically, international law was concerned only with the relations between states. AI;
a result, the international law of armed conflict developed in relation to inter-state
conflicts was not in any way concerned with conflicts occurring within the territory of
any state or with a conflict between an imperial power and a colonial territory.22

However, this history does suggest that the seeds that grew into the foundational
principles of the contemporary laws of war extended to the realm of internal armed
conflict by the Tadic ruling and applied to all US military operations by way of policy were derived from these internal military codes. Indeed, the fact that the contemporary laws of war find their origins in the practices of armed forces is also
highlighted by Professor Green: "the law of armed conflict is still governed by those
principles of international customary law which have developed virtually since
feudal times .. .. "23 It therefore seems significant that armed forces did not historically qualify application of these internal codes of conflict regulation on the
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character of the armed conflict. Nor can it be legitimately asserted that armed
forces bound by such internal codes were employed exclusively in the realm of
State-versus-State conflict. While this may have been the most common type of
their combat operations, the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also
include military engagements falling outside this category.24
Nonetheless, the historical context of the range of combat operations engaged
in by regular armed forces during this critical period of lega! development is significant when assessing appropriate scope of application of the contemporary principles of the laws of war. This history supports the inference that regular armed
forces historically viewed combat operations--or armed conflict-as an ipso facto
trigger for principles that regulated combatant conduct on the battlefield. This history is also instructive in exposing the fact that this "basic framework" concept was
severely strained during the years between the First and Second World Wars. This
strain was exacerbated by the fact that the scope of the emerging treaty-based regulatory regime was strictly limited to "war," which was understood in the classic
terms of a contention between States. 25
In this regard, it also seems relevant that even Common Article 2 was a response
to a perceived failure of the traditional expectation that anned forces would apply a
regulatory framework derived from either the laws and customs of war or internal
disciplinary codes when engaged in "war" between States.26 The rejection of "war"
as a trigger for application of the laws of war during inter-State conflicts in favor of
the "armed conflict" trigger was an attempt to prevent what one might understand
as "bad fai th avoidance" of compliance with the customary standards related to the
jus it! belloP The qualifier of "international" was, as indicated in the International
Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC) Commentary, an effort to emphasize that specific provisions ofthe Geneva Conventions were triggered by armed conflicts conducted under State authority.28 However, as that same Commentary indicates, it is
the "armed conflict" aspect of military operations that distinguish such activitiesand the law that regulates them-from the wide range of government activities not
involving the application of combat power by armed forces. It is therefore thoroughly consistent with the purpose and history of the Geneva Conventions to place
principal emphasis on the existence of armed conflict when assessing the appropriate trigger for the foundational principles reflected in those and other law of war
treaties.
This general concept-that the need to provide effective regulation of de facto
armed conflicts warrants resort to foundational principles reflected in treaties that
are technically inapplicable to a given conflict-was also endorsed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the fonner Yugoslavia. In Prosecutor v. Tadic,2'l the
Tribunal held that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
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fo rce between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."30
Of course, because the question before this Tribunal dealt with application of the
laws of war to international and/or internal armed conflict, or a combination
thereof, the significance of this language is primarily related to these traditional
categories of armed conflict.3l What was far more sign ificant about this decision
was the recognition that non -international armed conflicts trigger a regime of
regulation more comprehensive than only humane treatment. In ruling o n the
obligations applicable to participants in such non-international ar med conflicts
that provide a basis for ind ividual criminal responsibility, the Tribunal looked
beyond the h umane treatment mandate of Common Article 3. In addition to this
obligation , the T ribunal concluded that many of the fundamental rules related to
the methods and means of warfare applicable in international armed conflicts
had evolved to a pply as a matter of customary international law to non-international ar med conflicts.32 While the Tribunal noted that this evolution did not result in a "mechanical transfer" of rules from one category of ar med con flict to the
other, this ruling clearly encompassed what are characterized by many sources as
the foundat ional principles of the law of war. 33 According to the ruling, these
principles
cover such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities. in particular from
indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property.
protection ofall those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities. as well as
prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of
certain methods of conducting hostilities.34

The wisdom of the Tadic judgment recognizing the necessity of extending principles originally associated with international armed conflicts into the realm of
non-international armed conflict logically extends to both internal and transnational armed conflicts. Indeed, there seemed to be virtually no hesitation among legal
scholars and diplomatic officials for demanding application of these principles to
the recent conflict in Lebanon.35 Obviously, the alternate was unthinkable-that
intense combat operations could fall beyond the scope of any legal regulation. Nor
would application of the Hamdan ruling satisfy the perceived necessity to regulate
such a conflict, as that ruling in no way addressed application of principles regulating the methods and means of warfare. Instead, the reaction to the conflict indicated an emerging international expectation that participants in such conflictsand especially State fo rces-would be legally bound to comply with a range oflaw
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of war principles intended to mitigate the suffering inflicted by combat operations.
This evolution is achieving the imperative proposed below by Professor Roberts:
[IJn anti-terrorist military operations, certain phases and situations may well be
different from what was envisaged in the main treaties on the laws of war. They may
differ from the provisions for both international and non-international armed conflict.
Recognising that there are difficulties in applying international rules in the special
circumstances of anti-terrorist war, the attempt can and should nevertheless be made
to apply the law to the maximum extent possible. 36
In short. the logic animating the Department of Defense law of war policy, first
extended to the realm of internal armed conflicts by the Tadic Tribunal. had been
further extended to the realm of transnational armed conflicts. This evolution essentially treats the foundational principles of the law of armed conflict as a layer of
regulation upon which more comprehensive treaty regimes are built. In so doing. it
addresses the pragmatic necessity of regulation of de facto anned conflicts, while
preserving the continuing significance of the Common Article 2 applicability
criteria.

The Contiguous Conflict Dilemma:
Does Any Association Create a Unified A rmed Conflict?
Acknowledging that certain military operations conducted by the United States
against al Qaida trigger basic LOAC principles does not in and of itself mandate a
bifurcated conflict approach to Afghanistan. Instead, the viability of a distinct conflict theory vis-a.-vis al Qaida mandates analysis of whether the facts related to operations in Afghanistan render such operations under this category or under the
broader category of the armed conflict against the Taliban. This analysis must then
turn on the relationship between al Qaida in Afghanistan and the Taliban.
The LOAC, specifically Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). specifically addresses the status of
militia or volunteer corps personnel associated with a State party to an international armed conflict. That article provides that so long as certain conditions are
satisfied. such personnel are to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture. suggesting that their status is no different from that of members of the armed forces .
This in turn suggests that such militia and volunteer corps personnel are essentially
connected to the international armed conflict triggering application of the convention and Article 4.
This provision provides the strongest basis to assert a unified armed conflict
theory for Afghanistan. Indeed. this is the conventional approach to addressing the
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conflict classification issue related to al Qaida. The logic of this unified conflict theory is quite simple: Article 4 provides a basis to treat militia or volunteer corps personnel as prisoners of war; this suggests that such personnel are connected to the
international armed conflict triggering Article 4; accordingly, their treatment pursuant to Article 4 indicates that their operations must be within the context of the
broader international armed conflict.
While this logic is certainly appealing, it has unquestionably been undermined
by the emergence of a transnational armed conflict theory. Prior to this development in the law, the presumption that armed groups operating in association with
a State party to a conflict were part of that international armed conflict was conclusive, because no alternate theory of armed conflict could apply to such groups.
However, if it is conceptually possible that such groups can be involved in a distinct
armed conflict with the State party opposing the forces with which they are associated, this presumption can no longer be considered conclusive, but is instead
better understood as rebuttable.
It therefore seems more appropriate to treat al Qaida personnel operating in Afghanistan in association with the Taliban as presumptively part of the international
armed conflict between the United States and Afghanistan. Pursuant to this presumption, the status and treatment of captured al Qaida personnel would be pursuant to Article 4A(2 ) of the GPW: if they met the express qualifica tion
requirements of that article they were prisoners of war; if they did not they were civilians who had taken part in hostilities (with all the targeting and liability consequences that flow from such participation). Was there, however, a legitimate basis
to treat this presumption as rebutted? Answering this question requires consideration of the underlying purpose and meaning of the "associated militia" provision
of the GPW.
Article 4A(2) of the GPW was developed for a very clear purpose: to ensure that
individuals figh ting on behalf of a party to an international armed conflict who met
certain qualification conditions could claim the protections of prisoner of war status. The JCRC Commetltary to this provision indicates that the primary source of
disagreement among delegates to the drafting conference was the treatment of partisan and resistance groups in occupied territories. However, one aspect of the development of this provision seems dear: there is no disagreement that any
organized group claiming the benefit of Article 4 must be fighting on behalf of a
State party. According to the Commetltary
[iJt is essential that there should be a de facto relationship between the resistance
organization and the party to international law which is in a state of war, but the
existence of this relationship is sufficient. It may fmd expression merely by tacit
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agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate clearly fo r which side the resistance
organization is fighting.31

Thus, while such a relationship need not take the form of a fo rmal agreement or
declaration, it is clear that the militia must be operating on behalf of the State. As
the Commentary notes, organized militia groups that are not fighting on behalf of a
party to the conflict do not benefit from Article 4, b ut instead "the provisions of
Article 3 relating to non-international conflicts are applicable, since such militias
and volunteer corps are not entitled to style themselves a 'Party to the conflict."' 38
This comment seems to explicitly recognize that geographically contiguous armed
conflicts are indeed subject to legal bifurcation.
The emphasis of connection to a State party is also manifest in the provision of
Article 4 granting prisoner of war status to members of armed forces fighting on
behalf of a belligerent State authority not recognized by an opponent State. T reatment of such individuals apparently did not generate disagreement among the delegates to the drafting sessions, precisely because it was clear the belligerent conduct
of such forces was conducted on behalf of a de facto State authority:
At the Conference of Government Experts, delegations immediately app roved the
International Committee's proposal fo r a special clause to cover "members of armed
forces claiming to be under an autho rity not recognized by the enemy.» It was feared,
however, that the proposal might be open to abusive interpretation, and the
Conference therefore decided to add that such forces must, in order to benefit by the
Convention, be fighting "in conjunction" with a State recognized as a belligerent State
by the enemy.39

This express "in conjunction" language was removed in subsequent drafts, but
only because it was clear that the situation that motivated the provision-the treatment of forces fighting on behalf of the Free French authority during World War
II- made it clear that the provision would only be applicable when the "in conjunction" component was satisfied. Accordingly, the significance offighting on behalf of a "State" remained the sine qua tlO1I for such application.
Few experts would likely dispute the conclusion that fighting on behalf of a State
party is a condition precedent to application of Article 4 of the GPW. However,
what exactly does this mean? Unfortunately, the JCRC Commetltary provides virtually no guidance, a likely result of the fact that the primary concern fo r the drafters at the time Article 4 was revised was not this condition, but the fo ur "combatant
qualification" conditions required by Article 4A(2). However, the lack of discussion on this condition does not justify the conclusion that it has no substantive
meanmg.
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What does seem clear from the spirit and purpose of Article 4 is that the association of an organized militia group to a State party m ust be more than merely incidental. Simple geographic continuity of operations does not in itself seem to rise
above the concept of incidental association, a fact implicitly acknowledged by the
Commentary when it indicates that some militia groups might fall under the noninternational armed conflict legal regime. However, does a shared operational objective suffice to move beyond incidental association to the type of association required to trigger Article 4? In the opinion of this author, the answer is no.
The "on behalf' of language used by the ICRC Commetltary to explain the
meaning of article 4A(2) suggests more than a shared operational objective; it suggests that the militia or volunteer group be seeking to achieve that objective for the
primary purpose of contributing to the State's strategic objective. Thus, for a militia group to be operating "on behalf' of a State party, its operat ions m ust be
"nested" within the strategic and operational objectives of the State and its regular
armed forces. If the militia group is operating for the purpose of achieving its own
independent strategic objectives, the mere fact that some of these objectives might
be shared by the State party, or that the operational implementation of these distinct objectives leads the militia group to collaborate with the State party in tactical
execution, does not warrant the conclusion that it is operating on behalf of the
State.
There is a legitimate argument that it was this latter type of linkage that defined
the Taliban- al Qaida association in Afghanistan when the United States initiated
operations against both these entities. There is no indication that al Qaida was subordinate to the Taliban in either a de jure or de facto sense. O n the contrary, all indicators suggest that al Qaida had established what could be characterized as a
parasitic relationship with the Taliban-using the territory and resources offered
by the Taliban to further its own independent strategic goals. In many ways, this reOects a pelVerse inversion of the type of association envisioned by the drafters of
the GPW. Instead of al Qaida militia operating under the com mand and control of
the Taliban, Taliban forces were ostensibly subordinated to al Qaida command
and control to selVe al Qaida interests. 40
It also seems dear that the events that caused the United States to target al Qaida
with com bat power-the terror attacks of September I I-were not conducted "on
behalf' of Afghanistan. While it is undisputed that al Qaida had exploited the safe
haven provided to it by the Taliban, this was at the time merely the latest base of operations al Qaida had exploited.41 There is no evidence to indicate that al Qaida
launched the terror attacks of September I I at the direction of the Taliban or to
further some Taliban strategic objective. O n the contrary, the independent nature
of these attacks resulted in the destruction of the Taliban regime.
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All of this supports the conclusion that the association between al Qaida and the
State of Afghanistan was insufficient to support the presumption of Article 4 applicability discussed above. If al Qaida initiated an armed attack on the United States
as a distinct strategic objective, the mere fact that the military response to that attack led the United States to engage in armed conflict with the State that provided
safe haven to al Qaida does not necessarily justify the legal windfall of lodging the
conflict with al Qaida within the realm of the international armed conflict against
Afghanistan.
The alternate conclusion is, of course, not without merit. It is certainly plausible
that at least within the confines of Afghanistan, the conflict between the United
States and al Qaida should be treated as derivative of the broader conflict between
the United States and Afghanistan. But proponents of this theory should be required to muster more than mere geographic continuity, or even shared tactical
objectives. The linkage between these two entities must reflect that al Qaida operated in a derivative capacity to the Taliban armed forces, for only such evidence can
confirm the presumption that al Qaida was in fact operating "on behalf of' a party
to the conflict.
If al Qaida was not sufficiently connected to the Taliban in Afghanistan to qualify as operating on behalf of a party to the conflict, then what was the nature of military operations conducted by the United States against al Qaida forces in
Afghanistan? As I have argued elsewhere and outlined above, the de facto conflict
nature of such operations indicates that they should be considered to qualify as an
armed conflict triggering the basic regulatory framework ofLOAC principles. Others, however, argue that unless military operations against al Qaida fall within the
broader context of an armed conflict with Afghanistan, such operations are nothing more than extraterritorial law enforceme nt. It is to the fallacy of this proposition that this article will now tum.

The Fallacy of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement as a Legal Model for
Transnational Counterterrorism Military Operations
One of the most difficult issues related to military operations directed against
transnational terrorist operatives (what I will refer to throughout this section as
counterterror military operations) has been determining the appropriate legal
framework applicable to such operations. Since the United States characterized its
response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 as an "armed conflict," the
well accepted standards for determining when the law of armed conflict is triggered
have been thrown into disarray. In the years following that tragic attack, a variety of
legal theories have been offered to identify the appropriate locus of such operations
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within the international legal regulatory continuum. These have ranged from the
US position that such operations are armed conflicts triggering LOAC-derived authorities (althOUgh what type of anned conflict remains allusive), to the ICRC assertion that such operations are merely derivative of international armed conflicts
triggered whenever a State conducts military operations in the territory of another
State, to the assertion of human rights organizations that these operations fall under the human rights regulatory framework because armed conflict between States
and transnational non-State entities is a legal impossibility.
The skeptical reaction to the US assertion of a LOAC-based legal framework is
unsurprising considering the breadth of that assertion typified by the hyperbolic
characterization of a "Global War on Terror." But just as the nature of the military
component of the international struggle against highly organized terrorist groups
is much more refined than the broad concept of a "global war," so must be the
analysis of which legal framework operates to regulate such military operations.
Suggesting that the struggle against terrorism justifies invoking the "authorities of
war" for every aspect of counterterrorism operations-from detaining a terrorist
'"'foot soldier" on what is in all respects a conventional battlefield to capturing a terrorist operative with law enforcement assets in the midst of a peaceful domestic environ-is unjustifiably overbroad. But it is also unjustifiably under-inclusive to
demand that military operations launched for the purpose of employing combat
power against terrorist targets cannot be conducted pursuant to the LOAC legal
framework because those operations fa il to satisfy a law-triggering paradigm
that evolved with an almost exclusive focus on inter-State or intra-State armed
conflicts.
The stakes related to determining the applicable legal regime to regulate counterterror military operations are enormous. Not only do they have profound impact
on the rights and liberties of individuals captured and detained in the course of
such operations, but whether operations are conducted under the LOAC legal
framework or under the alternate human rights framework fundamentally impacts
the authority of State forces to employ combat power. Nor will pigeonholing every
operation under the inter-State conflict framework always produce a logical result.
While offering the benefit of application of the LOAC, such an approach-for example, treating the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah as a subset of an
armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon-results in what many consider to be
an unjustified benefit for non-State forces, namely the opportunity to qualify for
the privilege of combatant immunity.
But determining the nature of an armed conflict is secondary to detennining the
very existence of armed conflict. It is this issue-i.e., whether an armed conflict can
even exist outside the inter-State/intra-State paradigm-that generates the most
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fundamen tal debate related to the military component of the fight against international terror groups. For the United States, the answer is an unequivocal "yes."
However, this in no way indicates a consensus on this issue; far from it . Instead,
many experts in international law have insisted that such operations are not armed
conflicts, but instead "extraterritorial law enforcement" o perations.
This alternate legal framework was recently em phasized by Professor Yoram
D instein, certainly one of the international community's most respected jus belli
scholars. During the conference which inspired this article, Professor Dinstein articulated what he asserted was the clear and simple legal framework fo r the conduct
of transnational counterterror military operations. According to Dinstein, such
operations qualify as armed conflict under only two circumstances: firs t, when the
operations are essentially derivative to an armed conflict with the State sponsor of
the terrorist organization; second, when the actio ns of the terrorist o rganization
can be attributed to a sponsoring State as the result of terrorist authority over organs of the State. All o ther uses of force against such a threat must, according to
Dinstein, be regarded as what he labels extraterritorial law enforcement. Accordingly, he categorically rejected the pro position that such operations could am ount
to armed conflict.
I will attempt the unenviable task of challenging the clarity and simplicity of
Professor Dinstein's extraterritorial law enforcem ent theory. I will do so because I
believe his conception of the legal characterization of counterterror military operations employing combat power is fundamentally inconsistent with the underlying
nature of such operations. A far more im portant motive, however, is m y conviction that under appropriate circumstances treating such operations as events that
trigger LOAC obligations is much more consistent with the logic, history and spirit
of that law than attempting to characterize them as law enforcement missions.
Context for this argument is critical. I do no t suggest that there cannot be certain uses of the armed forces that do appropriately fall under a law enforcem ent legal paradigm. Instead, the nature of military operations I will focus on involve the
application of com bat power by the armed forces against a designated target or
gro up. For point of reference and clarity, the foc us of this article are those military
operations conducted by the armed forces against non -State actors operating outside the State's territory pursuant to what are essentially status-based rules of engagement. If, as suggested above, operatio ns conducted by the United States
against al Qaida personnel in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan can legitimately be segregated from the broader armed conflict against
the Taliban, they would fall into this category. Other examples include the 2007 US
AC 130 strike against an alleged al Qaida base camp in Somalia and the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon during the 1990s and again in 2006.
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Determining the nature of such military operations is central to the ongoing
struggle against transnational terrorism. Past and future military operations conducted to destroy, disable or disrupt the capabilities of such organizations have and
will remain operationally and legally complex. More significantly, they will continue to strain the accepted construct for determining LOAC applicability. The
depth of entrenchment of this construct no doubt explains Professor Dinstein's
hostility to the suggestion that such operations could, under certain circumstances,
qualify as armed conflicts for purposes of triggering LOAC obligations. However,
any assessment of the controlling legal framework for these military operations
m ust contemplate not only the "accepted" scope of the current law-triggering paradigm, but also the underlying purpose that motivated that paradigm. Perhaps of
equal importance is the necessity to consider the second- and third-order consequences of characterizing these operations as law enforcement.
This section will therefore focus on the following factors that I believe are essential to any analysis of the legal framework for military operations conducted against
transnational terrorist operatives. These include the underlying nature and purpose of the existing law-triggering paradigm; the relationship between the basic nature of employment of com bat power and the legal regime that should regulate that
employment; how the nature of the authority invoked reveals a fundamental distinction between the authority derived from the law of armed conflict framework
and that derived from the law enforcement framework; the importance of maintaining a bright-line distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello; and
the comparative feasibility of applying each framework to such operations. I believe these factors indicate that, contrary to Professor Dinstein's asser tion , relying
on the LOAC framework to regulate these operations is not only more logical but
more feasible than relying on a law enforcement legal framework.
The Nature and PurpoU! of the Traditional LOAC-T riggering Paradigm
All LOAC scholars and practitioners are versed in what I have previously characterized as the "either/or" law-triggering paradigm created by Common Articles 2 and
3 of the four Geneva Conventions and the interpretation of these articles that
evolved since 1949. This paradigm m ay have proved generally sufficient to address
the types of armed conflicts occurring up until 9/ 1 I. However, this fac t no longer
justifies the conclusion that no other triggering standard should be recognized. Instead, as the events since 9/ 11 have illustrated so convincingly, such recognition is
essential in order to keep pace with the evolving nature of armed conflicts themselves. The prospect of an unregulated battlefield is simply unacceptable in the in ternational community, a fact demonstrated by the response to the conflict in
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Lebanon.42 The ultimate question, therefore, is whether it is best to continue to try
and fit the proverbial square "armed conflict" peg into the round "Common Artide 3" hole, or whether the time has come to endorse a new category of armed conflict . It is the limited impact of Common Article 3 itself that compels the
conclusion that recognizing a new law-triggering category is essential.
Both the military components of the US figh t against al Qaida and the recent
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah have strained this traditionally understood
LOAC-triggering paradigm.43 While this strain has produced international a nd national uncertainty as to the law that applies to such operations,44 it has also provided what may actually come to be appreciated as a beneficial reassessment of the
trigger fo r application offundamental LOAC principles. As a result, the time is ripe
to consider whether the pragmatic logic that has animated military policy on this
subject for decades should not be regarded as something more, to wit a refl ection of
a general principle of law requiring that all military operations involving the employment of combat power fall under the regulatory framework of the LOAC
Before the United States Supreme Court issued its highly publicized ruling in
the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,4S the Court of Appeals for the District of Col umbia ruled on Hamdan's challenge. In the judgment of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,46 Judge
Williams articulated the logic motivating this reassessment in his concurring opinion. In that opinion, he responded to the majority conclusion that Com mon Article 3 did not apply to armed conflict with al Qaida because the President has
determined that this conflict is one of international scope:
Non-state actors cannot sign an international treaty. Nor is such an actor even a
"Power" thaI would be eligible under Article 2 ( 3) to secure protection by complying
with the Convention's requirements. Common Article 3 fills the gap, providing some
minimal protection for such non·eligibles in an "armed conflict not ofan international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." The gap
being filled is the non-eligible party's failure to be a nation. Thus the words "not of an
international character" are sensibly understood 10 refer to a conflict between a
signatory nation and a non-state actor. The most obvious form of such a conflict is a
civil war. But given the Convention's structure, the logical reading of "international
character" is one that matches the basic derivation of the word "international," i.e.,
between "ations. Thus, I think the context compels the view that a conflict between a
signatory and a non-state actor is a conflict "not of an international character." In such
a conflict, the signatory is bound to Common Article 3's modest requirements of
"humane" treatmenl and "the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."47
Although the logic expressed by Judge Williams seems pragmatically compelling, his interpretation did not sway his peers. This reflected the influence of
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Common Articles 2 and 3--and the legal paradigm they spawned-on conflict
regulation analysis. But, as Judge William s recognized, it is fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of the LOAC to disconnect the applicability of regulation
fro m the necessity for regulation. Judge W illiam s looked beyond the traditional interpretation of Common Articles 2 and 3 because he recognized that what was
needed was a pragmatic reconciliation of these two considerations. Ironically, it is
the long-standing policy of the US military that validates this interpretation of the
LOAC. That policy, as will be explained below, long ago rejected a formalistic interpretation of applicability of LOAC principles to military o perations in favor of a
pragmatic application based on the necessity of providing US forces with a consistent regulatory framework.

Recognizing the Regulatory Gap: How Military Policies Reflect the Necessity of
a "Principled" Approach to Military Operations
The need to provide a LOAC-based regulatory framework for all com bat operations, even those ostensibly falling outside the accepted law-triggering categories
derived from Common Articles 2 and 3, is not something that critics of Israeli operations targeting Hezbollah have o nly recently suggested. For m ore than three decades prior to this conflict, the armed forces of the United States fo llowed a clear
and simple mandate codified in the Department of Defense Law of War Program: 48
comply with the principles of the law of war during all military operations. While
this policy mandate has never explicitly articulated what precisely is m eant by
" principJes,"49 this tenn is generally understood to refer to the concepts that reflect
the fundam ental balance between the dictates of military necessity50 and the obligation to mitigate the suffering associated with armed conflict, concepts that provide the foundation fo r the more detailed rules that have evolved to implement
these principles. This foundational principle/specific rule relationship is explained
by Professor Adam Roberts:
Although some of the law is immensely detailed, its foundational principles are simple:
the wounded and sick, POWs and civilians are to be protected; military targets must be
attacked in such a manner as to keep civilian casualties and damage to a m inimwn;
humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel must be respected; neutral or nonbelligerent states have certain rights and duties; and the use of certain weapons
(including chemical weapons) is prohibited, as also are other means and methods of
warfare that cause unnecessary suffering.51

While the US Department of Defense has never explicitly defined the content of
the term "principles," m anuals for other armed forces do provide m ore clarity to
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the content of this term. For example, the recently revised United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Manual for the Law of Armed Conflict provides:
Despite the codification of much customary law into treaty fonn during the last one
hundred years. four fundamental principles still underlie the law of armed conflict. These
are military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality. The lawofarmed conflict
is consistent with the economic and efficient use of force. It is intended to minimize the
suffering caused by armed conflict rather than impede military efficiency. 52

For US forces and their operations, the significance of the mandate to comply
with these principles during all military operations is not diminished by the absence of a precise definition of this term. Instead, definition is left to operational legal
advisors based on their training and experience. What is significant for purposes of
this article is that the policy requires that US anned forces treat any military operation, and especially any operation involving the use of combat power (armed confli ct), as the trigger for application of a LOAC-based regulatory framework)3 This
policy has provided the basis for following LOAC principles during every phase of
the military component of what the Bush administration has characterized as the
"Global War on Terror."S-4
The motive for this policy was twofold. First, it was intended to provide a common standard of training and operational compliance during the range of military
operations. 55 Second, it responded to the reality that such operations are often initiated prior to a clear government determination of the legal applicability of the
laws of war. 56 Ultimately, the armed forces value this policy because they intuitively
understand that a framework for the execution of combat operations is essential to
the preselVation of a disciplined force. This is a critically important purpose oflegal
regulation of the battlefield, a consideration often overlooked by contemporary
commentators. Although no longer commonly cited as a critical purpose of the
LOAC, prior generations clearly understood this purpose. This is dearly evident by
the emphasis of this purpose in one of the most important precursors to the twentiethcentury evolution of the conventional laws of war, the Oxford Manual ofthe LAws of
War on LAnd: 57
By [codifying the rules of war derived from State practice[, it believes it is rendering a
service to military men themselves ... . A positive set of rules, on the contrary, if they are
judicious, serves the interests of belligerents and is far from hindering them, since by
preventing the unchaining of passion and savage instincts-which battle always
awakens, as much as it awakens courage and manlyvirtues,- it strengthens the discipline
which is the strength of armies; it also ennobles their patriotic mission in the eyes of the
soldiers by keeping them within the limits of respect due to the rights ofhumanity.S8
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The compelling logic reflected in this extract finds contemporary manifestation
in the policy mandates imposed on US and other armed forces that extend application of these principles to all military operations. These mandates indicate that the
application of combat power must always be subject to a basic regulatory framework. The gap in the accepted scope oflegally required LOAC application, coupled
with this logic, led other nations to follow the practice of imposing such regu1ation
by policy.59 Even the United Nations, habitually called upon to use military forces
in situations of uncertain legal classification, implemented an analogous mandate
for forces operating under its control. 60 However, no matter how logical such mandates may be in terms of military efficiency and humanitarian protections, their policy characters reveal a perceived gap between situations necessitating LOAC application and the technical legal triggers for such application. Furthermore, their policy
characters indicate that these mandates are ultimately subject to modification.61
The historical underpinnings of the LOAC and the contemporary application of
LOAC principles to a wide spectrum of military operations as a matter of national
policy indicate that the dispositive factor in determining when this regu1atory
framework should apply is the fundamental nature of the military operation in
question. When armed forces conduct operations employing combat power
against a defined enemy with authority to engage and subdue the enemy based
solely on that defined status, such operations shou1d be regarded as armed conflicts. Because of this, the underlying logic that has driven the historical application
of LOAC principles to regulate such operations provides compelling evidence in
support of extending this framework to counterterror military operations that fall
into this category, even when the enemy is a non-State entity with no plausible link
of attribution to the State in which it operates. As will be discussed below, an analytical focus on the fundamental nature of the authority invoked by the State indicates that the alternate proposition-to characterize such operations as law
enforcement-is unsupported by any analogous logic.
The Fundamental Distinction between the Law ofArmed Conflict Legal
Framework and the Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Legal Framework

The discussion above reveals why the regu1atol)' framework applicable to military
operations must respond to the de facto existence of armed conflict. However, it
also reveals why the existing understanding of this law-triggering paradigm has operated as an impediment to such application in any armed conflict not falling
neatly within the inter-State/in tra-State conflict categories. As a result, military
operations conducted by States against non-State operatives who operate transnationally fall into a category of regu1atory uncertainty. In response to this
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uncertainty, scholars like Professor Dinstein argue that such operations are best
understood as extraterritorial law enforcement activities, and not as armed conflicts. This view presumably indicates that it is a law enforcement legal framework,
and not LOAC principles, that functions to regulate such operations.
This is a significant assertion, for it dictates a scope of authority that is arguably
inconsistent with the fundamental nature and purpose of such military operations.
It is undoubtedly true that the ultimate objective of disabling the operational capabilities of terrorist organizations is the common purpose of any counterterror State
action. However, the means by which law enforcement activities achieve this objective differs fundamentally fro m the means by which military operations do so,
most significantly with regard to the use of deadly force. Indeed, the most fundamental distinction between law enforcement and armed conflict is manifested in
the scope of use of deadly force authority-a distinction between use of deadly
force as a last resort and use of deadly force as a first resort. Law enforcement activities, governed by international human-rights standards, reserve the use of deadly
force as a measure of last resort. In contrast, use of deadly force against a military
objective is a legitimate measure of first resort during armed conflict.
This basic distinction between relative authorities reveals in the starkest manner
the fundamental fallacy of characterizing military operations directed against
transnational terrorists as law en forcement operations, not based on an analysis of
the nature of authority associated with such operations, but merely on the basis of
incompatibility with the inter-$tate/intra-State law-triggering paradigm. In most
instances, the choice by the State to resort to military force against such a threat is
driven by the assessed need to employ deadly force as a measure of first, and not
last, resort. Consider the example of an airstrike conducted against a terrorist training facility operating with impunity in the territory of another State. It is inconceivable that the authority to employ deadly force relied on by the air assets
executing the mission will be contingent on a provocation from the terrorist target.
Nor is it conceivable that the air assets will be obliged to offer the potential targets
the opportunity to submit to apprehension as a condition precedent to the employment of combat power. Instead, the authority to employ that power will almost certainly be based on an inherent invocation of the principle of military
objective, allowing the use of deadly combat power based solely on the identification ofthe target as one falling into the category of a defined terrorist enemy.
Employment of combat power under this type of authority is not law enforcement. It is, quintessentially, a use of deadly force as a measure of first resort. The
LOAC provides the only legal justification for such a use of force. Accordingly,
based on the nature of the authority related to the military operation, armed conflict best characterizes the de facto nature of such activities, if for no other reason
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than the State's im plicit invocation of the principle of military objective as a justification for the use of deadly force. Characterizing such operations as law enforcement creates an immediate incongruity that undermines the fundamental nature
of that characterization: the suggestion that the use of deadly force is limited to a
measure of last resort and that less destructive means must be attempted prior to
such use.
No such incongruity would result from acknowledging that operations targeting terrorist operatives with combat power are armed conflicts. Instead, such acknowledgment achieves a critical effect: the authority im plicit1y invoked by the
State is counterbalanced by the limiting humanitarian principles of this law. In
short, if such operations are categorized as ar med conflicts, the law essentially creates a "package deal" for participants. While the principle of military necessityl
military objective may justify the employment of deadly force as a measure of first
resort, other principles limiting the methods and means of warfare and establishing baseline standards of treatment for captured and detained personnel also become applicable. Unless combat operations conducted against terrorist operatives
are understood to trigger this "package" of principles, States will contin ue to be
free to adopt a selective invocation of the fundamental authority derived from the
LOAC to take measures necessary to disable terrorist capabilities, while disavowing
legally mandated obligations derived from the same source oflaw.62

Th e Bright-Line Distinction between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello:
Remembering That Application o/ the LOAC Should Not Be Influenced by
Use 0/ Force Legality
Another significant objection to treating military operations directed against
transnational terrorists as triggering LOAC rights and obligations is that doing so
will somehow legitimize such uses of force. This argument, however, ignores the
historic bright-line distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. This
distinction has long stood for the proposition that the legality of war must not be
permitted to influence the applicability of the rules for conduct during war. This
distinction can genuinely be considered a fou ndational principle of the Geneva
Conventions and the de facto law-tr iggering provisions incorporated therein.
The ad bellumlin bello distinction is intended to achieve a critical effect: to ensure that the legal regime protecting the participants in armed conflict is not diluted or denied based on the choices of those who decide on armed conflict. It is a
reflection of the basic tenet of the Geneva Conventions-all individuals impacted
by armed conflict, civilian and warrior alike, are in essence "victims of war," for
they are not responsible for the decision to wage war. Accordingly, the legal
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regime that operates to limit the harmful effects of war on both warrior and civilian must be triggered by a pure de facto standard: the existence of armed conflict.
Of course, the primary concern at the time of the drafting of the Conventions
was preventing States fro m using the illegality of war as a justification for denial of
humanitarian protections. The issue related to the application of the LOAC to military operations between a State and non-State entity is quite the opposite. In this
context, the concern is that acknowledging that such operations trigger the LOAC
legal framework will bolster the legal justification for the use of force by the State.
Nonetheless, the underlying purpose of the ad bellum/in bello distinction is equally
applicable to this context and indicates that the legal framework that regulates the
conduct of military operations should in no way influence the assessment of the legality of those operations.
As I have written extensively elsewhere, this de facto standard is a core concept
of the existing law triggers of the Geneva Conventions. The focus of these triggers is
on the question of actual hostilities that rise above the level oflawenforcement activities. In such circumstances, the LOAC is the appropriate legal framework to
achieve the humanitarian objective oflimiting unnecessary suffering.
In the context of inter-State or intra-State hostilities, the line between a use of
State power fo r law enforcement purposes and armed conflict has been relatively
well defin ed. However, once States began to employ power outside their territories for the purpose of combating terrorism, this line became much blurrier. I
(with my co-author Eric Jensen) have addressed the problem of defining the line
between law enforcement and armed conflict in this extraterritorial context in a
prior article, asserting that the nature of the use-of-force authority employed by
armed forces is the most effective means of definition. It is not my purpose to expand upon that theory here. Instead, the basic concept reveals why the ad bellum/
in bello distinction is equally relevant in such a context. We argue that when a
State authorizes the use of combat power based on an inherent invocation of the
principle of military objective (in the form of status-based rules of engagement)
a situation of de facto armed conflict exists. Even assuming that the use of force
authorized by the State is in violation of the jus ad bellum, this in no way alters
the basic reality that the State has implicitly invoked the LOAC fo r purposes of
executing the operation. As a result, there is no justification to deprive the participants in associated hostilities of the benefit of the fundam ental principles of
that law.
What seems more appropriate, and certainly more consistent with the ad
bellum/in bello distinction that is an integral element in detennining LOAC applicability, is to treat the ad bellum/in bello issues as truly independent legal questions. Concluding a State's use of military force to target a terrorist entity is in
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violation of the jus ad bellum but is nonetheless armed conflict triggering funda mental LOAC rights and obligations seems more satisfactory than asserting the
jus ad bellum violation requires denying the participants in the hostilities the benefits of the legal framework best suited to regulate such activities.
Of course, characterizing such operations as law enforcement avoids this issue
entirely. Or does it? It is unlikely that a State will not be held to account for armed
interventions in the territory of other States simply because the State asserts it is exercising "extraterritorial law enforcement." And here lies the potential irony. In assessing the jus ad bellum legality of State action, it is almost certain that the de facto
nature of that action will be the focus, and not the characterizations adopted by the
State. As a result, use of combat power under the rubric of extraterritorial law enforcement creates a double failure: it will be insufficient to avoid condemnation for
a jus ad bellum violation, while at the same time it will deprive the forces engaged in
the operation of the clarity provided by the legal framework developed to regulate
the essential nature of their activities: armed conflict.

The Law ofAnned Conflict: A Defined and Intuitive Regulatory Framework
As suggested above, the regulatory framewo rk applicable to the conduct of military
operations against transnational terrorist threats should not influence the assessment of the legality of such operations. Accordingly, the primary analytical consideration for determining which legal framework is most appropriate for the
regulation of such operations is how effectively it achieves the regulatory purpose.
It is here that applying LOAC principles offers substantial benefit over applying a
law enforcement framework. This conclusion is supported by two primary considerations. First, fundamental LOAC principles are well established and well understood by professional armed forces. Indeed, these principles are so pervasive they
have formed the foundation for policy regulation of many military operations that
are not technically subject to the law. Second, because of this pervasive application,
armed forces are well versed in compliance with these principles and as a result
conducting operations pursuant thereto is relatively intuitive.
This is not the case with the law enforcement framework. As a general proposition, armed forces are not trained to conduct law enforcement operations. Unlike
their law enforcement counterparts, demanding a careful escalation of force to ensure that resort to deadly force is only a measure oflast resort is the exception to the
mindset normally demanded of military personnel. That mindset requires the ability to engage an enemy with deadly combat power on command. This often involves the application of overwhelming, and not graduated, combat power.
Imposing a law enforcement framework on military personnel requires a radical
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modification to the combat mentality, with all the training, planning and execution challenges associated therewith.
Ironically, one of the common criticisms of the assertion that military operations against transnational terrorist groups trigger LOAC principles is the uncertainty associated with determining what rules would apply to such operations. As
Professor Dinstem noted during one presentation , "Where do the rules come
from ? Do you just make them up in a library in Texas?" There is, however, no
need to "make up" any rules. Instead, as my co-author and I have noted elsewhere, the fundamental LOAC principles-military necessity, military objective,
proportionality and humanity-are well enough understood as to provide an effective starting point for the regulation of these military operations. Nor is extending these principles to transnational armed conflicts a radical suggestion, but
instead a process analogous to that which has led to the development of the regulation of internal armed conflicts (another point of particular irony, considering
that Professor Dinstein has been central to the proposed application of regulatory
provisions developed in the context of inter-State conflict to the realm of internal
conflict).
What seems particularly invalid about this criticism is that it seems even more
legitimately leveled against the extraterritorial law enforcement theory. Unlike
fundamen tal LOAC principles, there is no well established source of regulatory
principles that apply to the use of military force for extraterritorial law enforcement principles. If such operations are considered law enforcement, where do the
rules that govern those operations come from? While rules applicable to domestic
law enforcement activities are certainly well developed, there is no basis to assert
that they can simply be transplanted to apply to extraterritorial military operations.
Use oflaw enforcement would presumably be governed by the sending State's domestic policing statutes, an odd choice of laws in an extraterritorial use of force.
Accordingly, such a suggestion seems far more fabricated than applying LOAC
principles to combat operations against terrorist operatives. In the latter situation,
the armed forces would apply a body of rules that form the foundation of military
training and operations and were developed to limit the harmful consequence of a
State unleashing combat power. In the former, armed forces would be expected to
comply with a regulatory fra mework that was never developed nor intended to apply to armed hostilities.

Policy Application of the Law of Armed Conflict: Its Value and Limitations
Perhaps the most compelling evidence in support of the validity of applying the
LOAC framework to the type of military operations addressed in this article is that
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reliance on this framework as a "default" standard has been the long-standing solution to the legal uncertainties associated with contemporary military operations.
For several decades, the armed fo rces of major military powers have imposed an
obligation to comply with LOAC principles during all military operations, even
when those principles were not applicable as a matter of law. This practice was ultimatelyemulated by the United Nations as a solution to the dilemma of establishing a uniform regulatory standard for all UN forces engaged in peacekeeping
operations.
The logic behind this policy application ofLOAC principles reinforces the argument that the LOAC is better suited to provide for the regulation of counterterror
military operations than the law enforcement framework. Military leaders have
long understood that setting a LOAC-based default standard of regulation enhances the probability of disciplined operations by fac ilitating uniform training
and planning criteria. Perhaps more important, because the LOAC is the only
source of international law that evolved for the specific purpose of regulating military operations, its extension to all military operations was understood as pragmatically and operationally logical. In short, these policies indicate that military
operations are best regulated by the law developed for such a purpose, and not by
some artificial application of a body of law developed for an entirely different
purpose.
Indeed, the past effectiveness of this policy application of LOAC principles has
led some to assert that there is no need to wade into the controversial waters of confli ct characterization in relation to counterterror military operations, but that
compliance with these policies provides an effective solution to the regulatol)' dilemma. But this argument is flawed for two reasons. First, it is in effect an acknowledgment that these operations require the regulatory framework provided by the
LOAC, with an effort to avoid the difficult question of why this framework should
be applied. However, if the assumption is valid-that the nature of the operations
requires LOAC regulation-then that issue must be addressed head on; and the
reason for this is revealed in the second flaw of this argument.
Until the US response to the terror attacks of September 11, the "policy is
enough" argument held great merit. This was because issues related to the regulation of military operations and treatment of individuals captured and detained
during those operations were left almost exclusively to military decisionmakers.
However, it is widespread knowledge that this paradigm shifted dramatically after
those attacks. No longer was the military free to "apply the principles of the law of
war" with little or no interference from civilian policy- and decisionmakers. Instead, the intervention of these individuals exposed the limits of policy application
of these principles.
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In what are now regarded as notorious legal opinions, senior US government
lawyers and the decisionmakers they advised adopted policies related to the treatment of captured and detained personnel that deviated from the "principles" of
the LOAC. The justification for these decisions was clear: unlike law, policy is malleable. Accordingly, Departm ent of Defense policy became ineffective once the
leadership of the department or the nation chose to adopt inconsistent courses of
action. This process exposed why simply asserting a policy-based application of
LOAC principles to counterterror military operations is insufficient to address the
regulatory issue. Participants in these endeavors-and the individuals they engage
with combat power, subdue, capture and detain-require a legally defi ned and
mandated regulatory framework. While the long-standing policies requiring compliance with LOAC principles certainly indicate that these principles are the most
logical and appropriate source of regulation for these operations, policy is ultimately insufficient to provide this certainty. Only by acknowledging the legally
mandated applicability of LOAC principles to such operations will this certainty
be achieved.

Case-by-Case Application and the Rejection of the Zero-Sum Game
What I have attempted to do in this article is expose why it is invalid and disingenuous to characterize counterterror military operations employing combat power
under a "deadly force as a first resort" authority as extraterritorial law enforcement. Instead, these operations should be treated as triggering the foundational
principles of the LOAC. However, I am not suggesting a zero-sum game analysisthat all uses of the military in the struggle against transnational terrorism must be
characterized as triggering LOAC principles; far from it. What I have proposed
here and previously is that the essential nature of the use-of-force authority related
to any use of military power must dictate whether that use falls into the category of
armed conflict or instead remains under the assistance-to-Iaw-enforcement category. This may often be a difficult line to decipher. But rejecting the applicability of
LOAC principles to those operations that cross this line simply because to do so deviates from the entrenched law-triggering paradigm seems to defy the underlying
logic of the conventions that paradigm evolved from: a truly de facto law-triggering
standard that ensured the assertion of authority derived from the LOAC required
compliance with limiting principles of the same body of law.
Acknowledging that under the appropriate circumstances armed forces are
bound to comply with LOAC principles when conducting counterterror operations will not dilute the effectiveness of this law. It will instead ensure a balance of
authority and obligation. Nor will it result in a parade ofhorribles because of the
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uncertainty as to what rules apply to such operations. Applying the fundamental
principles of the LOAC to such operations is a feasible first step for such regulation,
and one with which many armed forces are familiar pursuant to the policy application of these same principles that has been required for decades. Furthermore, any
uncertainty as to the content of regulatory provisions derived from application of
the LOAC is insignificant in comparison to the subjection of such operations to a
law enforcement regulatory framework designed for a radically different purpose.
Nor do I believe that such acknowledgment will increase the uses of combat
power by States. While characterizing counterterror operations under the LOAC
framework will undoubtedly trigger more expansive authorities than law enforcement operations, requiring compliance with LOAC principles of constraint will
limit the scope of that authority. Furthermore, there are other significant factors
that will offset any tendency to treat such operations as armed conflict simply for
the benefit of expanded authority. These include not only jus it! bello considerations, which, when dealing with a terror target in anything other than a failed State
are profound, but also domestic political considerations, international relations
considerations and, perhaps most important, assessment of the most feasible
means to achieve the neutralization objective. All that is suggested here is that
when a State, after considering all these factors, chooses to unleash combat power
to achieve the national objective, the benefit of the LOAC regulatory framework
should not be denied simply because the enemy is a transnational organization
without traditional military structure.

Conclusion
Conflict classification is the essential first step in determining the rights and obligations of parties involved in armed hostilities. For decades, this classification process has been premised on the assumption that international law recognizes only
two types of armed conflict: inter-State and intra-State. This led to the evolution of
an "either/or" law-triggering paradigm: either the conflict was between two States,
satisfying the triggering criteria of Common Article 2, or the conflict was between a
State and a non-State armed entity within the territory of the State, satisfying the
triggering criteria of Common Article 3.
The increasing prevalence of extraterritorial military operations conducted by
States against non-State armed organized groups has resulted in an assertion that
such operations can qualify as armed conflicts. This theory oflaw applicability is
exemplified by the US treatment of the struggle against al Qaida as an "armed confli ct," a position dearly reflected in the Department of State enunciation excerpted
at the beginning of this article. Although controversial, it seems undeniable that
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this theory of what can be functionally characterized as "transnational" armed
conflict is gaining legal momentum.
The assumption that such a category of armed conflict can exist calls into question the related asswnption that military operations conducted by the United
States against al Qaida in Afghanistan could on1y be categorized as falling within
the broader armed conflict against the Taliban. While such a unified armed conflict
theory is certainly plausible, and concededly the presumptive position, it need not
be the only position. Instead, a careful assessment of the relationship between al
Qaida and the Taliban is necessary to determine whether such an outcome is justifiable. If, as is suggested in this article, the facts reveal that al Qaida did not operate
truly "'on behalf' of the Taliban , but instead had established more of a parasitic relationship to serve its own independent strategic objectives, then this presumption
becomes invalid. Such invalidity suggests that the conflict between al Qaida and the
United States in Afghanistan can and should be characterized as distinct from the
conflict between the United States and the Taliban.
This con flict bifurcation leads to another inevitable question: are extraterritorial counterterror operations armed con flicts? Or are they simply exercises of extraterritorial law enforcement? Resolving this question and determin ing the
most appropriate legal framework for the regulation of extraterritorial military
operations directed against transnational terro r operatives is no easy task, but it is
essential because of the increasing prevalence of such operatio ns. Since the
Un ited States began asserting it was engaged in an armed con flict with al Qaida,
scholars, legal advisors, policymakers and courts have struggled with this question, producing a wide variety of outcomes. Two major theories have evolved in
response to th is question. The first, epito mized by the US position, is that these
operations qualify as "armed conflicts" within the mean ing of international law,
triggering a heretofore un defined package of legal authorities and obligations.
The second is that armed con flict can only occur within the inter-State or intraState law-triggering paradigm established by Common Article 2 and Common
Article 3, and that military operations can be considered "armed confli cts" only if
they can be pigeonholed into one o f these categories. In all other cases, including
the use of combat power to target terrorist operatives in the territory of another
State, the military operations must be characterized as extraterritorial law en forcement activities, p resumably regulated by law enforcement authorities and
h uman rights obligations.
This article has asserted that this latter approach-rejecting the possibility of an
armed conflict between a State and a transnational non-State entity-produces an
illogical outcome disconnected from the underlying purpose of the LOAC. By essentially pushing a square peg into a round hole, it unjustifiably denies the armed
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forces and the people they encounter on what is indisputably a "battlefield" the
benefit of the regulatory fram ework developed specifically to limit the harmful
consequences produced when States unleash their combat power. While the overly
broad reach ofLOAC authority resulting from the Bush administration's assertion
of a "Global War on Terror" certainly justifies a cautious approach to the question
of legal characterization, an under-inclusive backlash is equally invalid.
What is necessary is a careful assessment of the fu ndamental nature of military
operations on a case-by-case basis. When those operations are conducted pursuant
to a "use of deadly force as a first resort" authority-normally revealed in the form
of status-based rules of engagement-it indicates an inherent invocation of the authority ofthe LOAC. Under such circumstances, armed forces must operate under
the obligations established by the fundamental principles of the same body of law.
These principles are generally well understood and have fonned the foundation for
operational regulation of a multitude of military operations conducted by many
armed forces for decades. Whatever uncertainty that may be inherent in these
principles is relatively insignificant compared to the far more uncertain regulatory
content of an extraterritorial law enforcement legal framewo rk. What is much
more problematic, however, is that military operations conducted pursuant to
status-based rules of engagement are fundame ntally inconsistent with a law enforcement legal framework, for the use of deadly force as a measure offirst resort is
the quintessential nature-and in all likelihood purpose for-such operations. As
such, it is the principles of the LOAC, and not those related to law enforcement activities, that are most logically, pragmatically and appropriately suited for such
operations.
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opera tion that q ual ified as an "armed conflict." No characterization qual ification was included,
and th e application paragraph demonstrates an extremely expansive interpretation of the con·
cept of armed conflict to which such principles apply:
Section I
FieJd of application
1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humani tarian law set o ut in
the presen t bulletin are applicable to Uni ted Nations forces when in si tuations of armed
conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the
d uration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions,
or in peacekeeping operations when the use of fo rce is permitted in self-defence.
UN Secretary-General, Bulletin on th e Observance by United Nations forces of in ternational
humanitarian law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, reprinted in 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MA TERlAlS 1656 (1999) .
61. See Noriega, supra note 56 (indicating that a policy-based application of the laws of war
is insufficient to protect the rights of General Noriega because it is subject to modification at any
time at th e will of the executive) .
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62. A brief comment here abo ut wha t some scholars have characterized as " militarized" law
enforcemenl. Pursuant to this theory, the overarching legal framework for extraterritorial
counterterror operations is best defined as a one derived from law enforcement authorities; but
under certain circumstances when the use of combat power to augment law enforcement capa·
bilities is req uired, the presumptive law enforcement activity would be considered Kmilitarized."
This theory seems to be consistent with the thesis of this article, if it suggests that when lawen·
forcement activi ties become Kmi litarized," that ratcheting up of means brings into effect a differ·
entlegal framework, namely LOAC principles. If, however, the suggestion is that when a State
Kmilitarizes" law enforcement activities, the armed forces engaged in operations are bo und to
comply with a law enfon:ement legal framework, then it seems that the effectiveness of the
"militarization" of the activity would be disabled due to an incongruous operational authority
equation.
One middle ground that might also be suggested by this concept is that anned forces wo uld
be regulated by LOAC principles during the operational phase of "militarized" law enforcement,
but that individuals captured and detained, once removed from the area of immediate conflict,
would be subject to a law enforcement legal regime. Such a hybrid approach seems responsive to
the primary objection leveled against the US invocation ofLOAC authorities vis-a.-vis captured
terrorists-namely their indefinite detention without trial on the basis of military necessity. It
also seems to accommodate the needs of the armed forces engaged in such operations by providing
them with the most logical legal framework during those operations. One other potentially
significant benefit of such a hybrid approach is that it would eliminate any incentive for an
unjustified invocation of LOAC authority as a subterfuge for avoiding nonnal legal process
related to detention.
It does, however, seem difficult to dispute the logic of detaining an individual who has acted in
what is for all intents and purposes a belligerent capacity against a State. The legitimacy of this
"militarized~ law enforcement theory rests on the assumption that existing domestic legal
authority for the trial and inca pacitation of such an individ ual will satisfy the necessity of
preventing a return to belligerent activities. If this assumption is valid, then the hybrid approach
holds great merit. If, however, the assumption is invalid, it seems inconsistent with a LOAC·
based authority that led to the capture of such an individual to require release with full
knowledge of a likely return to belligerent activities.
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